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Abstract
There is broad consensus among economists that unmitigated climate change will
ultimately have adverse global economic consequences, that the costs of inaction will likely
outweigh the cost of taking action, and that social planners should therefore put a price
on carbon. However, there is considerable debate and uncertainty about the appropriate
value of the social discount rate, that is the extent to which future damages should be
discounted relative to mitigation costs incurred now. We briefly review the ethical issues
surrounding the social discount rate and then report a simulation experiment that
constrains the value of the discount rate by considering 4 sources of uncertainty and
ambiguity: Scientific uncertainty about the extent of future warming, social uncertainty
about future population and future economic development, political uncertainty about
future mitigation trajectories, and ethical ambiguity about how much the welfare of future
generations should be valued today. We compute a certainty-equivalent declining discount
rate that accommodates all those sources of uncertainty and ambiguity. The forward
(instantaneous) discount rate converges to a value near 0% by century’s end and the spot
(horizon) discount rate drops below 2% by 2100 and drops below previous estimates by
2070.
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Harnessing the uncertainty monster: Putting quantitative
constraints on the intergenerational social discount rate
In its guidance on public sector project appraisal, Her Majestys Treasury in the
United Kingdom states that society “prefers to receive goods and services sooner rather
than later, and to defer costs to the future” (HM Treasury Green Book, Para. 5.49). Such
sentiment also influences social cost-benefit analysis guidelines in a wide range of countries
across the world. This desire of governments to receive benefits early and defer costs to
later underlies the concept of “social discounting”—that a dollar received tomorrow is
worth less than a dollar received today even when ignoring the effects of inflation (“real
discounting”).
There are a variety of arguments that support this approach. First, it is clear that
we are, by nature, impatient. When offered a reward of $15 right now, people on average
would require $20 a month from now to delay their reward till then (Thaler, 1981), even
though the accrual during that delay corresponds to an annualized interest rate of nearly
345%. Nearly indistinguishable results are obtained when respondents make intertemporal
choices between goods, rather than monetary rewards. For example, Pender (1996)
describes the strong desire of rural Indians to receive rice income sooner rather than later.
Although the particulars may vary across experiments, the basic finding that people
heavily discount rewards over short time periods, forms a pervasively replicated
benchmark finding in behavioral economics, with more than 3,000 articles on the topic
being indexed by the PsycArticles data base at the time of this writing. (For a review, see
Coller & Williams, 1999 or Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002). This
entrenched preference for the present, and the discounting of the future it entails, appears
to be an immutable aspect not just of human cognition but of organisms more generally.
When given the choice between a smaller reward now or a larger reward later, most
animals generally prefer the immediate reward (Stevens & Stephens, 2010).
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One reason for this impatience is, of course, that we may no longer be alive to enjoy
future benefits, or pay future costs, by the time they are due. A million dollars 10 years
hence may not appear worth terribly much to an 80-year-old, who might therefore
rationally prefer an immediate $100,000. Accordingly, people’s propensity to discount the
future is found to increase with age (Trostel & Taylor, 2001). Contrary to the proverbial
notion that impatience is a particular prerogative of the young, the data suggest that we
become more impatient—that is, more insistent on receiving rewards immediately rather
than later—as we age.
But impatience lies deeper than pure realization of our own mortalities. In humans,
decisions relating to the present involve regions of the brain (viz. limbic and paralimbic
cortical structures) that are also consistently implicated in impulsive behavior and
cravings such as heroin addiction, whereas decisions that pertain to the future involve
brain regions (viz. lateral prefrontal and parietal areas) known to support deliberative
processing and numerical computation (McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004).
Our strong preference for immediate rewards may therefore reflect the proverbial
“reptilian brain,” which competes with our “rational brain” that is telling us to consider
and plan for the future.
When evaluating longer time horizons, not only do we continue to show impatience,
even if at a lower annualized rate (e.g., Henderson & Bateman, 1995), we should also allow
for the underlying economic situation to change. In general, societies have become
wealthier over time, and this is also the forecast of most, but not all, experts for the future
(Drupp, Freeman, Groom, & Nesje, 2016). Since the poor are not generally expected to
subsidize the rich, societies should, all else being equal, prioritize the now over the future.
Economic growth forecasts and the strength of our desire to reduce consumption
inequality across time both affect governments decisions over discounting.
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These underlying features also help determine how financial markets set interest
rates; investors are also impatient and require capital growth that reflects changes in the
underlying macroeconomy. But once these bond yields are set, then they present
observable opportunity costs against which other projects can be appraised. For example,
if one were so inclined, one could compare the present cost of one’s education (tuition fees
due today) against the delayed rewards (higher expected salaries upon graduation) using
prevailing market interest rates.
Extending this markets-based approach to discounting in the public sector has been
favored by a number of international governments, including the United States. This is
described as the “positive” or “descriptive” approach to social discounting (e.g., Davidson,
2014). For example, suppose that the one year interest rate is 3%. Then, on the
assumption that a government wishes to recognize the opportunity cost of capital, it
would not choose to invest in a social project that cost $100 today but only gives societal
value of $102 in a year. Accordingly, the discounting of future costs and benefits is part of
the basic canon of economics. In general, an amount x0 today is worth xt in t years time,
where xt = x0 × (1 + ρ)t, where ρ is the applicable discount rate. Equivalently, if we wish
to determine the present value of an amount xt that is due in t years time, then
x0 = xt/((1 + ρ)
t). A preference for smaller immediate rewards over delayed larger
rewards is thus rational—and advisable—so long as social project appraisal decisions are
calibrated to plausibly achievable interest rates.
Enter climate change. The situation changes dramatically when inter-temporal
decisions cross generational boundaries and extend into the distant future. Today’s policy
decisions with respect to climate change will affect people who have not yet been born,
and whom today’s decision makers will never meet. The extended temporal horizon has
particularly pronounced implications vis-a-vis the discount rate. We illustrate with an
example provided by Dubgaard (2002) involving the future of Denmark. If the present
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value of real estate in Denmark is considered to be around $238 billion, then applying a
discount rate of 5%, $6 invested now will be worth the same as the current value of the
whole of the housing stock in Denmark in 500 years (Dubgaard, 2002). If we applied a
discount rate of 1% instead, then the future Denmark around the year 2500 would be
“worth” $1.6 billion of mitigation efforts today. The striking difference between $6 and
$1.6 billion reveals why “the biggest uncertainty of all in the economics of climate change
is the uncertainty about which interest rate to use for discounting” (Weitzman, 2007,
p. 705). Seemingly slight variations in the discount rate suffice to make climate mitigation
efforts appear either very compelling and highly cost effective (Stern, 2007) or less
pressing (Nordhaus, 2007).
The choice of an appropriate discount rate for climate economics has therefore been
hotly contested in policy, economics, and ethics. This debate has failed to yield a
consensual value, with some scholars proposing that the discount rate for climate change
should be negative (Fleurbaey & Zuber, 2012) and others permitting a rate in excess of
6% (Nordhaus, 2007). Central to this argument has been whether the descriptive
approach to discounting is appropriate in a social context when projects span generations.
In particular the highly influential Stern Review (Stern, 2007) and a number of
governments in Europe, prefer to estimate the social discount rate directly from its
primitives rather than using market rates of interest. There are a number of reasons for
this choice (see, e.g., Drupp et al., 2016). For example, while we know that individuals are
impatient for themselves, many economists and philosophers would argue that we cannot
be impatient with respect to future generations. In addition, those most affected by
climate change—the poor, often in developing countries, who have not yet been
born—cannot influence bond yields. This places a burden on governments to take a wider
ethical perspective than investors do when trading in financial markets. This alternative
approach to estimating the social discount rate, which underlies this paper, is called the
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“normative”, or “prescriptive”, approach (Davidson, 2014) and is often represented
through the Ramsey Rule (Ramsey, 1928).
In this article we provide quantitative constraints on the discount rate for climate
change by considering several sources of uncertainty and ambiguity about its appropriate
value. Specifically, we report a simulation experiment that explored the parameter space
underlying the social discount rate and computed a single “certainty-equivalent” rate
(explained below) that integrates across all those sources of uncertainty. Figure 1 provides
an overview of the experimental design and guides the discussion. To foreshadow our
principal conclusion, when all those sources of uncertainty and ambiguity are considered
simultaneously, the certainty-equivalent discount rate declines over time and converges to
a value below that of various previous estimates by 2070.
Experimental design
Disentangling discounting
The social discount rate, also referred to as the consumption discount rate, is
conventionally understood within the framework developed by Ramsey (1928), which
expresses the social discount rate, ρs, as a function of two distinct components:
ρs = η × g + δ, (1)
where g is the expected average annual real economic growth rate, δ represents a “pure
time preference”, and η is a parameter that captures people’s risk aversion and inequality
aversion. The rationale for inclusion of the growth rate, g, is that growing wealth makes a
given cost for future generations more bearable than it appears to us now, in the same
way that $100 is valued a great deal more by a poor student than by a wealthy
industrialist. The effect of future wealth is modulated by η, which variously describes risk
aversion or inequality aversion.1 The pure time preference component, δ, which is also
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referred to as the utility discount rate, reflects people’s intrinsic preference for the present,
or their “impatience” (e.g., Thaler, 1981).
Within the Ramsey framework we thus have to consider three quantities to
determine the social discount rate: Future economic growth (g), risk aversion (η), and
pure time preference (δ). All three of those quantities are at least partially amenable to
quantitative estimation. Future growth rates can be estimated by economic modeling (e.g.
Nordhaus, 2007), risk aversion can be inferred from asset markets (Epstein & Zin, 1991)
and behavioral surveys (Barsky, Kimball, Juster, & Shapiro, 1997), and pure time
preference can be inferred by behavioral experiment (e.g., Zauberman, Kim, Makoc, &
Bettman, 2009). It is therefore in principle possible to estimate the social discount
rate—with some degree of uncertainty—using the earlier descriptive approach (Davidson,
2014).
However, because of the far-reaching implications of the discount rate, many
scholars have argued against a descriptive solution and in favor of a prescriptive approach,
whereby the social discount rate is determined, at least in part, by ethical and moral
considerations (e.g., Adler & Treich, 2015; Davidson, 2014; Stern, 2007). To illustrate,
assume that g = 0 in Equation 1 and that empirical estimates of δ are in the range of 5%.
In that case, we would burden our descendants with the disappearance of Denmark
because we were unwilling to expend more than $6 on climate mitigation, based entirely
on estimates of how strongly people prefer instant gratification over a delayed reward
(because with g = 0 future generations are assumed to be no wealthier than us). Ethical
considerations also apply to determining the value of η: risk aversion and inequality
aversion are moral constructs, and Hume’s dictum that the “ought” cannot be derived
from the “is” therefore casts doubt on the relevance of its estimability.
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We next briefly discuss those ethical ambiguities and other sources of uncertainty
about the discount rate. This defines the multi-dimensional variable space which we then
explore in our simulation experiment (Figure 1).
Ethical ambiguities of discounting
We abhor slavery and other forms of domination, defined as situations in which one
group of persons can determine arbitrarily and without significant reciprocation the
conditions of another group’s lives (Nolt, 2011). Because “future people have no power to
resist or retaliate against our emission of greenhouse gases” (Nolt, 2011, p. 67), some
ethicists have argued that the adverse future effects of climate change (e.g., the risk of
displacement of up to 187 million people through sea level rise; Nicholls et al., 2011)
constitutes unacceptable inter-generational domination. Considerations along those lines
are frequently taken to imply that δ should be set to zero. Ramsey (1928) himself called it
“ethically indefensible” to “discount later enjoyments in comparison with earlier ones”
(p. 543). Likewise, Adler and Treich (2015) argue that any value δ > 0 “embodies a clear
violation of the attitude of impartiality that is foundational to ethics” (p. 283).
The notion of “stewardship” towards future generations is also intrinsic to most
world religions and was articulated poignantly in the recent encyclical of Pope Francis
(2015). Accordingly, (Stern, 2007) set δ = 0.1%, with the residual positive value
representing a presumed risk of human extinction.
However, the seemingly attractive idea of treating all generations equally by setting
δ ∼= 0 entails some unnerving consequences (Pearce, Groom, Hepburn, & Koundouri,
2003). In general, the lower the discount rate, the more future consumption matters and
hence the more we should set aside for the benefit of future generations. When δ = 0.1%
and η = 1, as favored by Stern (2007), the mathematically implied savings rate is 97%
(Dasgupta, 2008). That is, out of $100 we may only consume $3, with the remainder
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being taxed away for the benefit of our children. Our children, in turn, would also only be
allowed to spend $3 of their considerably greater wealth, with the remainder being passed
on to their children, and so on ad infinitum. An implication of zero discounting therefore
is the impoverishment of each current generation for the benefit of the succeeding one.
To avoid this conundrum, scholars have variously proposed an alternative,
rank-based discounting schemes (Zuber & Asheim, 2012) or have argued for a higher value
of δ on the basis of moral considerations. For example, Nordhaus (2007) assumed
δ = 1.5%. Because this ethical debate is ongoing, we explore values of δ of 0% (with 65%
weighting) and 3.15% (with 35% weighting); see top left of Figure 1. Those estimates of δ
and their probability weighting are based on a recent survey of 200 experts by Drupp et
al. (2016) and are thus empirically constrained vertices of this ethical space.
Similarly, we let η take on values of 0.5 and 2.2 with equal probability. Although
risk aversion and inequality aversion are informed by ethical considerations, these
boundaries are broadly consistent with findings from the expert survey by Drupp et al.
(2016). The values of η and δ were fully crossed (top left of Figure 1), thereby providing
an exploration of the space of likely ethical considerations.
Uncertainties about future growth
Modeling the effects of warming on economic production. Application of Equation 1
requires knowledge of future economic growth. Conventionally, those estimates may be
obtained by economic modeling of the future (e.g., Nordhaus, 2007) or by extrapolation
from historical data on the assumption of a steady-state economy. Here we rely on a
recent empirical model reported by Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel (2015) that examined the
marginal effects of temperature on gross domestic product (GDP) for more than 160
countries during the last 50 years (1960–2010) while controlling for a host of other
variables (e.g., secular trends, country-specific idiosyncracies, and so on). Burke et al.’s
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principal finding was that temperature has a curvilinear relationship with economic
production, with an optimum at around 13◦C. All other variables being equal, economic
production declines with lower or higher average temperatures. The curvilinear
relationship holds equally for rich and poor countries, and it holds equally for the early
part of the period examined (1960–1989) and the late period (1990–2010). The
relationship is also robust to a wide variety of other variables (Burke et al., 2015,
Supplementary Methods).
The empirical model permits projection of economic growth through the end of the
century as a function of three variables that are the source of considerable uncertainty:
the sensitivity of the climate to carbon emissions, the emissions trajectory that results as
a result of policy choices, and the socio-economic development pathway that the world is
following. We orthogonally combine those three variables to examine their effect on
projected global growth (top-right panel of Figure 1).
Scientific uncertainty about climate sensitivity. There is no doubt about the fact
that the globe is warming in response to greenhouse gas emissions from human economic
activity, and that this warming has been ongoing without notable interruption or
cessation (Cahill, Rahmstorf, & Parnell, 2015; Lewandowsky, Risbey, & Oreskes, 2016,
2015). There is, however, some uncertainty about how much warming can be expected in
response to emissions. This scientific uncertainty is encapsulated in the standard deviation
of the estimate of a quantity known as climate sensitivity, which refers to the amount of
warming (in ◦C or, equivalently, K) that is expected in response to a doubling of
atmospheric CO2 concentrations compared to preindustrial levels. Estimates of sensitivity
have ranged from around 1.5◦C to 4.5◦C for more than 4 decades (Freeman, Wagner, &
Zeckhauser, 2015, see also further discussion below). There are compelling reasons,
relating to feedback loops, why this uncertainty range is unlikely to be substantially
reducible (Roe & Baker, 2007).
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We represent uncertainty by the standard deviation of the (lognormal) distribution
of possible realizations of climate sensitivity in our climate model, which we varied in 6
steps; 0.26◦C, 0.37◦C, 0.64◦C, 0.83◦C, 1.17◦C, and 1.66◦C. Mean sensitivity was kept
constant. Exploring the effects of different levels of uncertainty about climate sensitivity is
important in light of the fact that greater uncertainty translates into greater risks and
damage costs in nearly all circumstances (Freeman et al., 2015; Lewandowsky, Risbey,
Smithson, Newell, & Hunter, 2014; Lewandowsky, Risbey, Smithson, & Newell, 2014). It is
unknown, however, how the effects of uncertainty interact with other variables that
contribute to global growth paths.
Policy uncertainty about emissions trajectories. We compared the “Representative
Concentration Pathways” (RCPs) that are used by the IPCC to explore different climate
futures (Bindoff et al., 2013). Although RCPs are not directly interpretable as policy
choices and emissions trajectories (because they are defined by the atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases rather than emissions), they represent the likely
consequences of policy choices.
We employed the climate forcings (i.e., the imbalance of incoming and outgoing
energy that results from atmospheric greenhouse gases) provided by RCP 2.6, RCP 4.5,
RCP 6.0, and RCP 8.5 for the period 2000 through 2100 as input to our climate model.
These RCPs span the range from aggressive mitigation and limiting global temperature
rises to approximately 2◦ (RCP 2.6), to continued business as usual and extensive
warming (RCP 8.5). (Data available at: http://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at:8787/RcpDb/dsd).
Uncertainty about future economic development. We compared two “Shared
Socio-Economic Pathways” (SSPs). SSPs form the basis of the IPCC’s projections of
future global development in Working Group 3. We employed two scenarios, SSP3 and
SSP5, also used by Burke et al. (2015). SSP3 assumes low baseline growth and slow global
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income convergence between rich and poor countries; SSP5 assumes high baseline growth
and fast global income convergence. (Data available at:
https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/SspDb/dsd). The SSPs provide the
“baserate” growth rates that were entered into the empirical model described above to
obtain climate-adjusted growth projections.
Summary
The orthogonal combination of the variables just described yields an experimental
design for uncertainties about future growth that fully crosses 6 levels of scientific
uncertainty with 4 levels of policy uncertainty (RCPs) and 2 levels of uncertainty about
future global development (SSPs). For each of the 48 cells of this design, 1,000 simulation
replications were performed by sampling a realization of climate sensitivity from the
appropriate lognormal distribution. For each realization, global temperatures were
projected to the end of the century and the economic effects of climate change were
derived by considering the relevant SSP in conjunction with the empirical model relating
temperature to economic production. Cumulative average growth rates for the remainder
of the century were then computed across the 1,000 replications in each cell of the design.
These 48 projected global economic trajectories to the end of the century, each of
which represented the expectation under one set of experimental conditions, were then
converted into candidate social discount rates. At this stage the ethical considerations
(top left Figure 1) were applied to each trajectory, by combining each of the 48 projected
global economic growth rates (g) with the four combinations of δ and η using Equation 1.
This yielded 192 candidate discount rates (48 × 4) across all combinations of experimental
variables. In a final step, those candidates were integrated into a single
certainty-equivalent declining discount rate (CE-DDR) using a process known as “Gamma
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discounting” (K. Arrow et al., 2013; Pearce et al., 2003; Weitzman, 2001), which is
sometimes known instead as “Expected Net Present Value”.
Gamma discounting: Harnessing uncertainty about the
discount rate
If the future discount rate is uncertain, what is the appropriate way to handle this
uncertainty? Suppose we believe that future interest rates could be 1% or 7% with equal
probability? How do we best plan for that future? Recent work in economics has yielded
considerable progress on this issue (e.g., K. Arrow et al., 2013; K. J. Arrow et al., 2014;
Freeman, 2010; Gollier, 2002; Weitzman, 1998, 2001). One outcome of this research has
been that it is not the discount rates that are to be averaged (e.g., by computing the mean
of 1% and 7%, viz. 4%), but the (discounted) net present values associated with those
rates at various points in the future. Weitzman (2001) termed this Gamma discounting
and we use his terminology here.
Table 1 illustrates Gamma discounting using an example provided by K. Arrow et
al. (2013). The table shows discounted values of $1,000 at various times in the future for
three different discount rates (ρ). For example, if ρ = 4%, then the present value of $1,000
after 50 years is $135.34, and so on. Uncertainty about the discount rate is represented by
the heterogeneity among the discounted values across the entries for each time t. For
example, assuming an equal probability of ρ being 1% or 7%, then 50 years from now our
$1, 000 can be worth either $606.53 or $30.20. It follows that the average of those two
uncertain values represents the probability-weighted expectation for our $1, 000, which 50
years from now is ($30.20 + $606.53)/2 = $318.36. These mean expected present values
are shown in the column labeled MEV in Table 1 for our $1, 000 at various points in the
future on the assumption that the discount rate is either 1% or 7% with equal probability.
The temporal relationship between successive MEVs, finally, yields a single
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certainty-equivalent discount rate (CE-DDR) for any given point in time. For example,
the MEV at t = 50 is $318.36, and the MEV at t = 51 is $314.33. The ratio between those
successive values, $318.37/$314.33 = 1.0128 = 1.28%, provides the instantaneous CE-DDR
at time t = 50 (also known as “forward” rate), and those values are shown in the
second-to-last column of Table 1. This single declining discount rate can be applied with
100% certainty, and will yield the same discounted values as application of multiple rates
with less than 100% certainty (K. Arrow et al., 2013).
While the forward (or instantaneous) CE-DDR captures the slope of the declining
discount rate function between times t and t+ 1, those rates cannot be used to discount
an amount from the present to time t—that is, the MEV at time t = 50, for example,
cannot be obtained by discounting $1,000 at a rate of 1.28%. This requires a different
certainty-equivalent discount rate, which is also declining but has generally higher values
than the instantaneous rate. This rate is called the “spot” (or “horizon”) CE-DDR and is
shown in the final column of the table. Application of this rate to our present-day $1,000
(or any project amount that is small relative to the size of the economy; Dietz & Hepburn,
2013) for time t will yield the MEVs for that time shown in the table. We report both
forward (instantaneous) and spot (horizon) CE-DDRs from our experiment.
Gamma discounting has been applied in a variety of contexts where the discount
rate is uncertain, including situations in which there is uncertainty about future economic
growth (Fleurbaey & Zuber, 2012). The theoretical grounding for Gamma discounting is
particularly firm when the candidate fixed discount rates (first three columns in Table 1)
arise from irreducible heterogeneity among expert opinions rather than from random
variation about an imprecise estimate (Freeman & Groom, 2015). Different ethical
positions about risk aversion (η) and pure time preference (δ) are clear instances of
irreducible heterogeneity, and we likewise consider the different levels of the remaining
variables in our experimental design to represent the views of different hypothetical
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experts: Some experts might opine that the world will follow an SSP5 trajectory whereas
others argue that the world will follow an SSP3 trajectory and so on. By contrast, the
replications within each cell of the design are not considered to constitute irreducible
heterogeneity but realizations of the future under a homogeneous, but noisy, scenario. It is
for these theoretical reasons that we integrate across replications within each experimental
cell to obtain a single expected growth trajectory that is then entered into Gamma
discounting together with its counterparts, as noted earlier.
Simulation procedure and results
Emulating global climate change
Global temperature projections were obtained from a climate emulator proposed
and tested by Raupach et al. (2011). Unlike a general circulation model (GCM), which
models the atmosphere (and/or oceans) at a high resolution and therefore requires
immense computing power, an emulator captures the behavior of a GCM at a global level
and can be computed more rapidly.
The emulator converts radiative forcings into global temperatures, using a climate
step-response function that is characterized by (in this case) three terms, obtained by
inverting the Laplace transform of the climate response function for the HadCM3 model
reported by Li and Jarvis (2009). The climate response function includes a parameter for
climate sensitivity, represented by λq. (See Equation A6 and Table A2 in Raupach et al.,
2011).
There are different ways in which climate sensitivity—i.e., warming in response to
CO2 doubling—can be operationalized, depending on how much time elapses after CO2
doubling before the temperature increase is measured. The IPCC relies primarily on
equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS), which involves timescales of years to decades after
CO2 doubling, during which the atmosphere and upper oceans have had time to come into
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temperature balance. There are, however, numerous other feedback loops that operate at
longer time scales, such as ice sheets and ocean circulation (Lunt et al., 2010), and the
ultimate warming in response to CO2 doubling may be greater and much delayed
compared to ECS. This ultimate sensitivity to greenhouse gas emissions is labeled earth
system sensitivity (ESS) and has been estimated to be 30-50% greater than ECS (Lunt et
al., 2010).
Because the longest time scale in the three-term climate response function in our
emulator is nearly 1500 years, the modeled climate sensitivity is best understood as ESS
rather than ECS. We kept ESS constant at λq = 4.6
◦C (1.235KW−1m2), the value used
by Raupach et al. (2011) in a validation of the emulator against the IPCC’s projections.
This value is higher than estimates of ECS, which typically range from 1.5◦C to 4.5◦C
(Freeman et al., 2015). For each simulation replication, a realization of ESS was sampled
from a lognormal distribution with mean µESS = 4.6 and standard deviation σESS , where
the value of σESS depended on the experimental condition.
Figure 2 illustrates the combined effects of scientific uncertainty (changes in σESS)
and climate policy uncertainty (RCPs) on global temperature projections from our
emulator.
Relating global temperature to economic production
Using the data made available by Burke et al. (2015), we estimated regression
weights for their (unlagged) base model with per capita GDP growth as the criterion. Our
estimates of 0.0103 for temperature and -0.0004 for the square of temperature correspond
closely to the values reported by Burke et al. (see their Extended Data Table 1; first
column).
Projected global temperatures were obtained from the emulator for 2010–2100 and
expressed as anomalies relative to 2010. Those global projections were converted into
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country-specific projections using the relationships observed under the RCP8.5 scenario
for the mean projections of the CMIP5 model ensemble (Taylor, Stouffer, & Meehl, 2012).
That is, the mean projected temperature increases for the CMIP5 ensemble between the
reference periods 2080–2100 and 1986–2005 were used to estimate the factor by which
each country differed from the global average (e.g., Botswana is expected to warm by 1.45
times the global average, whereas Argentina is only expected to experience 0.90 of the
average, and so on). Those factors translated projected global temperatures into expected
warming for each country, which in turn were converted into country-specific marginal
effects of climate change on economic growth. That is, the economic growth trajectory
expected for each country from the relevant pathway (SSP3 or SSP5) was adjusted
upward or downward by the temperature-determined marginal effect of climate change.
Global GDP projections. Global GDP trajectories, obtained by summing the
country-specific trajectories, are shown in Figure 3 for the two most extreme RCPs
(RCP 2.6 and RCP 8.5, in the top and bottom row of panels, respectively) and the two
most extreme values of uncertainty about climate sensitivity (σESS = 0.24
◦C and
σESS = 1.66
◦C in the left-hand and right-hand column of panels, respectively).
Note that global GDP is expected to increase under most circumstances, except in
Panel d, when scientific uncertainty is greatest (σESS = 1.66
◦C), expected growth
smallest (SSP3), and mitigation absent (RCP 8.5).
Figure 4 summarizes the average global GDP growth rates through the end of the
century across all conditions of the experiment. The greatest source of difference again
arises from which shared socioeconomic pathway that the world will follow (SSP3 vs.
SSP5), with all other sources of uncertainty being subsumed under that primary variable.
When year-to-year growth is considered, it is clear that under SSP3 without mitigation
overall global growth may be negative for decades towards the end of the century (Panel
a). When the cumulative average annual growth is considered, as required for
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computation of discount rates (Panel b), growth no longer turns negative (because the
annual rates late in the century are averaged into all rates leading up to that point) but
nonetheless declines late in the century.
By the year 2099, the cumulative average growth rate across the 48 cells of the
experimental design is 1.60%, with a standard deviation of 0.88% (Figure 4 panel b).
These values are almost identical to the mean (1.70%) and standard deviation (0.91%) of
expert opinions on future long-term economic growth rates reported by Drupp et al.
(2016).
Country-specific GDP projections. The aggregation at the global level obscures
considerable variability among countries: Although some cool countries are expected to
benefit from climate change, countries that are already near or beyond the optimum
temperature will suffer. Figure 5 shows the proportion of countries (out of 165) whose
year-to-year per capita GDP growth rate is projected to be negative, again showing the
most extreme levels of climate uncertainty (in columns) and the most extreme RCPs
(rows).
Except in the most favorable circumstances (SSP5 with strict mitigation; Panels a
and b), a notable share of countries will experience economic decline at some point during
the remainder of the 21st century. Under unfavorable conditions (SSP3 without
mitigation; Panels c and d) around two thirds of all countries will experience decline by
the end of the century.
Notably, even under stringent mitigation (RCP 2.6, top panels), when uncertainty
about climate sensitivity is large (Panel b), under SSP3 more than 20% of countries
experienced decline late in the century for at least 10% of the realizations (solid red line in
Panel b). For the same mitigation path, when uncertainty was at its lowest (Panel a), this
proportion was notably less and even the most extreme realization (dotted red line in
Panel a) caused less than 20% of countries to decline. This pattern (comparing columns of
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panels) extends earlier results showing that greater uncertainty about the value of climate
sensitivity creates greater adaptation and mitigation risks (Freeman et al., 2015;
Lewandowsky, Risbey, Smithson, Newell, & Hunter, 2014; Lewandowsky, Risbey,
Smithson, & Newell, 2014).
Relating uncertain future economic production to the social discount rate
The certainty-equivalent discount rates obtained from the projected growth rates
via Equation 1 are shown in Figure 6 for various ethical scenarios. In an all inclusive
scenario, all conjunctions of δ (0; 3.15%, probability-weighted 65% and 35%, respectively)
and η (0.5; 2.2) contribute to the distribution of candidates for Gamma discounting; this
scenario is labeled “Gamma” in the figure. In the remaining 4 scenarios, δ and η are set to
the values indicated in the legend.
It can be seen that when all ethical ambiguities are considered, the forward
(instantaneous) rate declines very rapidly, falling below 2% by around 2040 and heading
towards a value near 0 by century’s end. The spot (horizon) rate, which integrates across
all intervening values of the forward rate and is applicable when seeking to discount the
costs and benefits of a present project, naturally falls off less rapidly but dips below 2% by
century’s end. Note that this result is obtained using a realistic probabilistic weighting of
the alternative values of the ethical variables based on expert responses (Drupp et al.,
2016).
The declining schedule obtained by our experiment is placed into a broader context
in Figure 7. The figure compares our results to relevant precedents that also estimated the
social discount rate applicable to climate change. Previous estimates were variously based
on analysis of historical interest rates (Groom, Koundouri, Panopoulou, & Pantelidis,
2007; Newell & Pizer, 2003), analysis of expert surveys (Freeman & Groom, 2015;
Weitzman, 2001), or policy recommendations (e.g., the U.K. Treasury’s “Green Book”).
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Our approach differs from those precedents by relying on explicit modeling of the impact
of future climate change on economic production. When the likely impact of climate
change on the global economy is considered, a more rapid decline of the discount rate is
observed than in previous work. By 2070, our estimates of the spot (horizon) rate dips
below the other past benchmark estimates considered here.
Discussion
We conclude from the experiment that when the full range of uncertainties is
considered, then irrespective of one’s ethical stance towards inter-generational discounting,
the computationally-constrained value of the social discount rate declines steeply across
the remainder of the century and dips below 2% for the end of the century, when the
effects of climate change will be felt most acutely. This meshes well with the median
long-run social discount rate elicited from experts (Drupp et al., 2016). We consider our
work to provide a proof of concept, with much further exploration remaining to be
performed. Potential limitations of our work must be noted before we can suggest some
implications.
Potential limitations
Limitations of the climate emulator. Two caveats apply to our climate emulator
that concern the conversion of emulated global temperatures into country-specific
warming. Those conversion factors were calibrated against the ensemble mean of the
CMIP5 model projections for RCP8.5. However, the regional details of warming are quite
uncertain given that they depend on dynamical climate responses, such as the El Nin˜o
Southern Oscillation (ENSO) or changes in atmospheric circulation patterns related to the
Arctic Oscillation, which vary widely across models. Therefore, a logical extension of our
analysis would add yet another degree of freedom to the phase space where we explore the
varying spatial footprints of predicted warming across models within the CMIP5 ensemble.
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Moreover, it is unknown whether the global-to-country conversion factors estimated
for RCP8.5 remain invariant under different warming scenarios, such as the other RCPs
examined here. Future work has to examine the robustness of this calibration across
warming scenarios, as well as across models.
Limitations of the empirical model. Several caveats also apply to the empirical
model relating temperature to economic productivity (Burke et al., 2015). First, our
simulation used a point estimate of the regression parameters for temperature (and its
square), as did Burke et al.. This ignores a further source of uncertainty, namely the
parametric uncertainty in the empirical model. Future work might usefully include that
additional source of uncertainty in an experiment. A second caveat concerns the upper
limit on temperatures in the empirical model: To avoid out-of-sample predictions, Burke
et al. limited all future temperatures to the maximum observed in their historical sample,
and we followed that practice here. Accordingly, the consequences of extreme future
warming would have been curtailed by the model for countries that are already hot or
warm. It remains to be seen whether removal of this ceiling would exacerbate the
economic consequences already seen with RCP 8.5 towards the end of the century.
The final caveat concerns the presumed benefits of warming that is expected for cool
countries from the empirical model. The model is limited in two ways: First, it considers
only the effects of average temperature, which ignores the increase of extreme weather
events (including floods, storms, and heat waves) that even cool countries are arguably
already beginning to experience (e.g., AghaKouchak, Cheng, Mazdiyasni, & Farahmand,
2014; Coumou & Rahmstorf, 2012; Seneviratne, Donat, Mueller, & Alexander, 2014).
Those extreme events may increasingly offset the benefit of slightly warmer temperatures
in the historical record. Similarly, in a globalized economy, cool countries may suffer
economic losses when hitherto unprecedented climatic events occurring elsewhere disrupt
supply chains (Levermann, 2014). Second, the empirical model is based on historical data
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and its application to the future thus tacitly assumes a stationary environment. It is
therefore unclear whether the model can deal with historically-out-of-sample effects when
the environment becomes increasingly non-stationary. Non-stationary environments
provide a particular challenge to estimating return-periods and return-levels of extreme
events, although some promising developments exist (e.g., Cheng, AghaKouchak,
Gilleland, & Katz, 2014). An extreme form of non-stationarity involves tipping points,
beyond which irreversible large-scale impacts become inescapable. Expert elicitation
reveals that at least five potential tipping points—reorganization of the Atlantic
meridional overturning circulation; collapse of the Greenland Ice Sheet; collapse of the
West Antarctic Ice Sheet; dieback of the Amazon rainforest; and an increase in the
amplitude of ENSO—are consensually considered to constitute a significant risk (Kriegler,
Hall, Held, Dawson, & Schellnhuber, 2009). Specifically, Kriegler et al. put the lower
bound on the probability of triggering at least one of those events in response to
2◦C − 4◦C warming at 16%, and at 56% (i.e., better than even) if global temperatures
exceed 4◦C warming relative to 2000 temperatures. A conservative estimate of the impact
of such tipping points is in the vicinity of 10% of global GDP (Lontzek, Cai, Judd, &
Lenton, 2015).
We therefore suggest that the model may underestimate the adverse impact of
climate change on future economic activity.
Assumptions about mitigation costs. We used the same empirical model to relate
temperatures to economic production in all cells of the experimental design. This may be
potentially problematic for any RCP other than 8.5 because we do not model mitigation
costs explicitly. We believe that this omission is justified for several reasons: first, because
the projected growth rates for the other RCPs are consistently above those for RCP 8.5,
the declining discount rates rates we obtain in the end are conservative and constitute an
upper bound—that is, they could not be higher if mitigation costs are considered. If
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mitigation reduced growth rates compared to RCP 8.5 then Gamma discounting would
yield even lower declining rates. We find this unlikely based on indicative work by van
Vuuren et al. (2011).
Second, it is far from clear that the impact of mitigation on economic growth can be
modeled with any degree of reliability. Recent work has suggested that even the direction
of the effect—i.e., whether mitigation accelerates growth or decreases it—cannot be firmly
established (Rosen & Guenther, 2015). We therefore believe that a demonstrably robust
(Burke et al., 2015) empirical model that is not adjusted for mitigation costs may yield
better insights into the future than attempts of explicit modeling that are associated with
greater uncertainty (Rosen & Guenther, 2015).
Assumptions underlying the social discount rate. Several assumptions underlying
our approach need to be highlighted. First, the candidate distribution of discount rates
determines the value of the CE-DDR. If the distribution of candidates shifts, so does the
CE-DDR. In the experiment, we estimated the values and weights associated with δ and η
based on expert responses (Drupp et al., 2016). However, for the uncertainty variables
and their conjunctions (top-right panel in Figure 1), we have no information about the
likelihood of the realization of their various values (e.g., whether RCP 2.6 is more or less
likely to materialize than RCP 8.5) and in the absence of such knowledge all levels of were
considered to be equally likely. It remains for future research to determine whether this
assumption is plausible. Likewise, the consequences of adding intermediate levels to the
experimental factors (e.g., intermediate values of η) remain to be observed.
Second, our main result relied on the gamma discounting proposed by (Weitzman,
2001). The boundary conditions of gamma discounting are a source of active debate (e.g.,
Freeman & Groom, 2016; Jouini & Napp, 2014), although it can be theoretically defended
in many situations; for example, when experts have irreducibly different ethical opinions
(e.g., about pure time preferences; see Freeman & Groom, 2016). It is, however,
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theoretically less well-established whether gamma discounting is also applicable when
experts differ in risk aversion (cf. Jouini & Napp, 2014).
Third, our analysis has focused on a single global CE-DDR. This may be an
over-simplification and some researchers have argued for its disaggregation into
country-specific (and indeed person-specific) discount rates. One analysis along those lines
has converged on the conclusion that the discount rate should be negative for climate
change (Fleurbaey & Zuber, 2012). Further work along those lines is particularly
important for ethical reasons (Singer, 2006): A single global discount rate tacitly
presumes that the beneficiaries of current and future wealth are the same—after all,
discounting according to Equation 1 presumes that our descendants are sufficiently
wealthy to cope with the damages that we cause by limiting mitigation costs. Given that
it is poor countries that will bear a disproportionate burden from climate change whereas
rich countries benefit from avoiding mitigation (Costello et al., 2009), the global discount
rate carries considerable hidden ethical baggage (Singer, 2006).
Implications
There has been much recent work on declining discount rates. A common theme of
this work is the convergence to a low value over time (e.g., K. Arrow et al., 2013;
K. J. Arrow et al., 2014; Freeman, 2010; Freeman & Groom, 2015; Gollier, 2002; Gollier &
Hammitt, 2014; Groom et al., 2007; Newell & Pizer, 2003; Pearce et al., 2003; Weitzman,
2001). Our results confirm this convergence under a new set of circumstances, when
various different sources of uncertainty and ambiguity are considered and when future
growth rates are modeled based on a robust historical relationship between temperatures
and economic production.
The suggested value of the CE-DDR that arises from our analysis is considerably
lower than some previous estimates (e.g. Freeman & Groom, 2015; Groom et al., 2007;
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Newell & Pizer, 2003). This meshes with the results of Burke et al. (2015), who found
that their projected economic damages from climate change were far greater than
estimates obtained from conventional economic models. We suggest that this difference
reflects the fact that our modeling, like Burke et al.’s, explicitly takes into account the
non-stationarity of economic production that arises under climate change. Whenever
non-stationarity has been explicitly considered in previous work, the anticipated
consequences have been far more dire than anticipated under stationary modeling (e.g.,
Lontzek et al., 2015; Moyer, Woolley, Matteson, Glotter, & A, 2014).
One immediate implication of the lower estimate yielded by our analysis is that it
will further strengthen the impetus for climate mitigation by increasing the social cost of
carbon. Compared to a constant discount rate of 4%, a declining discount rate that
reaches 2% somewhere around 2100, doubles or triples the social cost of carbon emissions
(K. Arrow et al., 2013). If our even lower value turns out to be robust, this would further
increase the social cost of carbon although the magnitude of the effect remains to be
determined.
However, at least one note of caution applies to declining discount rates because
they may engender unexpected resource depletion in a “tragedy-of-the-commons” situation
(Hepburn, 2003, cited in Pearce et al., 2003). It remains to be seen whether this result is
robust, but it would be of particular concern in the context of climate change, which is
perhaps the greatest “tragedy-of-the-commons” problem faced by humanity to date.
Conclusion
We aimed to provide quantitative constraints on the social discount rate that is
applicable to climate change. Our estimates decline rapidly to below 2% at the end of the
century when we integrate across a range of contrasting ethical positions about pure time
preference and risk aversion.
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Although this estimate is lower than that obtained by related previous work, it may
nonetheless be conservative in light of the fact that possible tipping points in the climate
system are not considered. Moreover, our work does not resolve other equally pressing
ethical issues arising from cost-benefit economics in climate change, such as the valuation
of environmental goods. We may be able to put a (discounted) price tag on all the real
estate in Denmark, but that tells us nothing about the value of natural goods such as the
natural beauty of the Danish country side, the existence of song birds, or species diversity
(e.g., Ackerman & Heinzerling, 2004; Freeman & Groom, 2013; Funtowicz & Ravetz,
1994).
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Footnotes
1 The role of η is quite nuanced and intricate, as it can in turn be decomposed into
various additional components (K. J. Arrow et al., 2014; Atkinson, Dietz, Helgeson,
Hepburn, & Slen, 2009; Gollier, 2002; Kaplow & Weisbach, 2011; Pearce et al., 2003). For
present purposes those details need not concern us because our analysis explores a range
of values of η and the precise underlying factors that determine those values do not affect
the outcome.
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Table 1
Present value of $1,000 received or expended after t years with various discount rates and
their certainty-equivalent declining discount rate obtained by Gamma discounting
$1,000 at time t a CE-DDR (%) c
t 1% 4% 7% MEV b Forward Spot
1 990.05 960.79 932.39 961.22 3.94 4.03
10 904.84 670.32 496.59 700.71 3.13 3.62
50 606.53 135.34 30.20 318.36 1.28 2.32
100 367.88 18.32 0.91 184.40 1.02 1.71
150 223.13 2.48 0.03 111.58 1.01 1.47
200 135.34 0.34 0 67.67 1.01 1.36
300 49.79 0.01 0 24.89 1.01 1.24
400 18.32 0 0 9.16 1.01 1.18
aColumn entries are values of $1,000 at time t (years hence) discounted by the rate (ρ) for
that column.
bMEV = Mean expected present value if ρ = 1% or ρ = 7% with equal probability.
cCE-DDR = Certainty-equivalent declining discount rates.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Overview of experimental design. The variables in the top panels are combined
in an orthogonal design. Full crossing of levels of each factor is represented by the
⊗
operator, and factor levels are shown in each box. Sampling from all combinations of
sources of uncertainty (top right panel) yields a probability distribution of projected
economic growth rates (shown by the shaded distribution), whose average is combined
with the parameters determined by ethical considerations (top left panel) to yield
candidate social discount rates, ρs. Candidate rates are then combined into a single
certainty-equivalent declining social discount rate (CE-DDR) using the process known as
gamma discounting (Table 1).
Figure 2. Representative emulator output. Panel a shows 1,000 realizations for each RCP
drawn from a lognormal distribution with σESS = 0.24
◦C, and Panel b uses
σESS = 1.66
◦C. In each panel, the mean projection across the 1,000 realizations is shown
by a bold solid line with the shaded polygon representing the observed variation across
realizations. Observations for 1950–1999 (drawn in black) are based on historical forcing
estimates (Hansen, Sato, Kharecha, & von Schuckmann, 2011) and observations from 2000
onward are based on RCP projections.
Figure 3. Global GDP trajectories for two RCPs (RCP 2.6 in the top row and RCP 8.5 in
the bottom row) and two levels of uncertainty about climate sensitivity (σESS = 0.24
◦C in
the left-hand column of panels and σESS = 1.66
◦C in the right-hand panels). Each panel
presents two scenarios of economic development (SSP3 and SSP5). Plotting symbols
represent mean trajectories across 1,000 realizations of climate sensitivity, solid lines
represent the 10th percentile of realizations, and the dashed lines the minimum of the
1,000 realizations.
Uncertainty and Social Discount Rates 40
Figure 4. Global growth rate trajectories for year-to-year annual growth (left panel) and
cumulative average annual growth from 2010 onward (right panel). The socio-economic
pathways (SSP3 and SSP5) are represented by the two pairs of lines as indicated.
Figure 5. Proportion of countries (out of 165) with a net negative growth rate for two
RCPs (RCP 2.6 in the top row and RCP 8.5 in the bottom row) and two levels of
uncertainty about climate sensitivity (σESS = 0.24
◦C in the left-hand column of panels
and σESS = 1.66
◦C in the right-hand panels). Each panel presents two scenarios of
economic development (SSP3 and SSP5). Plotting symbols represent mean trajectories
across 1,000 realizations of climate sensitivity, solid lines represent the 90th percentile of
realizations, and the dashed lines the maximum of the 1,000 realizations.
Figure 6. Certainty-equivalent declining discount rates obtained in the experiment. Panel
a shows forward (instantaneous) rates and panel b spot (horizon) rates. The different
parameters in each panel refer to different ensembles of candidate rates that are integrated
by Gamma discounting. The line labeled “Gamma” integrates across all sources of
uncertainty and ambiguity using 192 candidates, and the remaining 4 lines integrate across
48 candidates using the particular conjunction of η and δ as indicated in the legend. Rates
are quoted on a continuously compounded basis for comparability with previous research.
Figure 7. Comparison of spot (horizon) CE-DDRs obtained in the experiment in this
paper to current practice (U.K. Treasury) and previous research by Freeman & Groom
(2015), Weitzman (2001), Newell & Pizer (2003), and (Groom et al., 2007). The line for
our experiment represents Gamma integration across all 192 candidate rates; see Figure 6,
panel b.
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